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Reliable Shared Memory Abstractions on Top of Asynchronous t-Resilient Byzantine
Message-passing Systems
Damien Imbs* Sergio Rajsbaum* Michel Raynal** *** Julien Stainer***
Abstract: This paper is on the construction and the use of a shared memory abstraction on top of an asynchronousmessage-passing
system in which up to t processes may commit Byzantine failures. This abstraction consists of arrays of n single-writer/multi-reader
atomic registers, where n is the number of processes. A distributed algorithm building such a shared memory abstraction it first
presented. This algorithm assumes t < n/3, which is shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for such a construction. Hence,
the algorithm is resilient-optimal. Then the paper presents distributed algorithms built on top of this shared memory abstraction,
which cope with up to t Byzantine processes. The simplicity of these algorithms constitutes a strong motivation for such a shared
memory abstraction in the presence of Byzantine processes.
For a lot of problems, algorithms are more difficult to design and prove correct in a message-passing system than in a shared
memory system. Using a protocol stacking methodology, the aim of the proposed abstraction is to allow an easier design (and
proof) of distributed algorithm, when one has the underlying system is an asynchronousmessage-passing system prone to Byzantine
failures.
Key-words: Approximate agreement, Asynchronous message-passing system, Atomic read/write register, Broadcast abstraction,
Byzantine process, Distributed computing, Message-passing system, Quorum, Reliable broadcast, Reliable shared memory, Single-
writer/multi-reader register, t-Resilience.
Abstraction d’une mémoire partagée fiable dans les systèmes asynchones à passage de messages où jusqu’à
t fautes Byzantines peuvent survenir
Résumé : Cet article propose une abstraction de mémoire partagée adaptée aux systèmes asynchones à passage de messages où
jusqu’à t fautes Byzantines peuvent survenir. Il présente également une implémentation de cette abstraction ainsi que sa preuve.
Mots clés : Accord approché, systèmes asynchrones à passage de messages, registres atomiques read/write, diffusion fiable,
processus Byzantins, calcul distribué, quorums , mémoire partagée fiable, tolérance à t fautes.
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1 Introduction
Distributed computing Distributed computing occurs when one has to solve a problem in terms of physically distinct entities
(usually called nodes, processors, processes, agents, sensors, etc.) such that each entity has only a partial knowledge of the many
parameters involved in the problem. In the following, we use the term process to denote a computing entity. From an operational
point of view this means that the processes of a distributed system need to exchange information, and agree in some way or another,
in order to cooperate to a common goal. If processes do not cooperate, the system is no longer a distributed system. Hence, a
distributed system has to provide the processes with communication and agreement abstractions.
Understanding and designing distributed applications is not an easy task [3, 14, 22, 23, 24]. This is due to the fact that, due
its very nature, no process can capture instantaneously the global state of the application it is part of. More precisely, as processes
are geographically localized at distinct places, distributed applications have to cope with the uncertainty created by asynchrony and
failures. As a simple example, it is impossible to distinguish a crashed process from a very slow process in an asynchronous system
prone to process crashes.
As in sequential computing, a simple approach to facilitate the design of distributed applications consists in designing appropriate
abstractions. With such abstractions, the application designer can think about solutions to solve problems at a higher conceptual level
than the one offered by the basic send/receive communication layer.
Byzantine behavior This failure type has first been introduced in the context of synchronous distributed systems (e.g., [12, 21,
23]), and then investigated in the context of asynchronous ones (e.g., [3, 14, 22]). A process has a Byzantine behavior when it
arbitrarily deviates from its intended behavior; it then commits a Byzantine failure. Otherwise it is non-faulty (or non-Byzantine).
This bad behavior can be intentional (malicious) or simply the result of a transient fault that altered the local state of a process,
thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way. Let us notice that process crashes (unexpected halting) and communication
omissions, define a strict subset of Byzantine failures.
The major part of the papers on Byzantine failures considers (synchronous or asynchronous) message-passing systems, and
mainly addresses agreement problems, such as consensus and total order broadcast, or the construction of a Byzantine-tolerant disk
storage (e.g., [7, 11, 15, 16, 17]). Many of these papers consider registers built on top of duplicated disks (servers), which are
accessed by clients, and where disks and clients may exhibit different type of failures (e.g., [2]). Moreover, in these client/server
models, clients communicate only with servers and vice versa (the communication graph is bipartite).
The reason why different types of failures are addressed in [2, 11] comes from the fact that these papers consider “classical”
read/write registers, namely, a register may be modified any number of times, and each read must return the last value that was
written. In this context, a Byzantine client can overwrite a value it has previously written, and trick correct clients so that they
believe that it wrote only once. To prevent this bad scenario, [11] considers clients that can fail only by crashing, while [2] restricts
clients to be “semi-Byzantine”: they can issue a bounded number of faulty writes, but otherwise have to respect the code of their
algorithm.
Content of the paper: Construction of an atomic read/write memory Differently, this paper is on the construction of a shared
memory (atomic registers) on top of an asynchronous message-passing system where processes may exhibit a Byzantine behavior.
Its first contribution is the definition of a shared memory (atomic registers) in the context of Byzantine processes, and the design of
an algorithm that builds such a shared memory on top of an asynchronous message-passing systems where up to t processes may be
Byzantine. These registers differ from classical registers in that each read returns the complete history of writes to the registers. This
prevents the problem mentioned previously where a Byzantine process can make different correct processes read different values
from the same register. This t-resilient shared memory is made up of n single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) atomic registers (one
per process). The paper also shows that t < n/3 is a necessary and sufficient requirement for such a construction.
This construction and the associated upper bound t < n/3 complement the previous result known on the construction of an
atomic shared memory in asynchronous crash-prone message-passing systems, where it has been shown that t < n/2 is an upper
bound on the number of faulty processes [1]. Interestingly, the upper bound t < n/3 is the same as the one for solving consensus
in both Byzantine synchronous systems [12] and Byzantine asynchronous systems (enriched with an appropriate oracle such as a
common coin) e.,g. [6, 19].
Content of the paper: From read/write registers to higher level abstractions The second contribution of the paper is a set of
algorithms that solve distributed computing problems on top of the previous t-resilient shared memory abstraction. These algorithms
illustrate the versatility of these Byzantine-tolerant atomic registers. The two first algorithms, which are pretty simple, solve the
“one-shot write-snapshot” problem, and the “correct-only” agreement problem (a weakened version of the consensus problem),
respectively. Then the paper describes an algorithm that solves the multidimensional approximate agreement on top of the t-resilient
shared memory abstraction. This algorithm can be seen as an adaptation to a Byzantine read/write shared memory system of
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Mendes-Herlihy’s algorithm [18], which solves the same problem “directly” on top of an asynchronous Byzantine message-passing
system.
As shown by these examples, the important feature of the proposed shared memory abstraction lies in the fact that it prevents
Byzantine processes from corrupting synchronization among the correct processes. A Byzantine process can create inconsistency
only on the values it writes, but any two correct processes see the same sequence of written values.
Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 introduces the underlying Byzantine asynchronous message-passing
model. Section 3 defines the notion of Byzantine-tolerant atomic read/write registers, and presents an algorithm that builds such
registers on top of the basic Byzantine asynchronous message-passing model. This section shows also that t < n/3 is a necessary
and sufficient requirement for such a construction. Then, Section 4 and Section 5 present algorithms that solve distributed computing
problems on top of Byzantine-tolerant atomic registers. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Computation Model, Reliable Broadcast and Two Lemmas
2.1 Computation Model
Computing entities The system is made up of a set Π of n sequential processes, denoted p1, p2, ..., pn. These processes are
asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and remains always unknown to the
other processes.
Communicationmodel The processes cooperate by sending and receivingmessages through bi-directional channels. The commu-
nication network is a complete network, which means that each process pi can directly send a message to any process pj (including
itself). It is assumed that, when a process receives a message, it can unambiguously identify its sender. Each channel is reliable
(no loss, corruption, or creation of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out, and asynchronous (while the transit time of each
message is finite, there is no upper bound on message transit times). Moreover, Byzantine processes are not prevented from reading
all messages and reordering them.
Byzantine failures The model parameter t is an upper bound on the number of processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [12,
21]. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages,
start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send the same
message m to all the processes, can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to another subset of processes,
and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation.
Terminology and notation A Byzantine process is also called a faulty process. A process that never commits a failure is called a
correct (or non-faulty) process. Given an execution, let C and F denote the sets of correct and faulty processes, respectively.
This process model is denoted BAMPn,t[c(n, t)], where c(n, t) is a constraint imposed on the model parameter t. As an
example c(n, t) ≡ (n > 3t) means that less than one third of processes may be faulty.
2.2 Reliable Broadcast Abstraction
This section presents a reliable broadcast abstraction (denoted r-broadcast), that will be used to build atomic read/write registers.
(Section 3). This abstraction is a simple generalization of a reliable broadcast due to Bracha [5]. While Bracha’s abstraction is for
a single broadcast, the proposed abstraction considers that each process can issue a sequence of broadcasts. It is shown in [5] that
t < n/3 is a necessary requirement when one has to build such an abstraction in the presence of asynchrony and Byzantine failures.
Specification The reliable broadcast abstraction provides each process with the operationsR_broadcast() and R_deliver(). When a
process pi invokes R_broadcast()we say that “pi r-broadcasts a value”. Similarly, when pi returns from an invocation of R_deliver()
and obtains a value, we say “pi r-delivers a value”.
The operation R_broadcast() has two input parameters: a broadcast value v, and an integer sn, which is a local sequence
number used to identify the successive r-broadcasts issued by the invoking process pi. The sequence of numbers used by each
(correct) process is the increasing sequence of consecutive integers.
• RB-Validity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from a correct process px, then px invoked the operationR_broadcast(v, sn).
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• RB-Integrity. Given any process pi and any sequence number sn, a correct process r-delivers at most once a pair (−, sn) from
pi.
• RB-Uniformity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from pi (possibly faulty), then all the correct processes eventually
r-deliver the same pair (v, sn) from pi.
• RB-Termination. If the process that invokes R_broadcast(v, sn) is correct, all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the
pair (v, sn).
RB-Validity relates the outputs to the inputs, namely what is r-delivered was r-broadcast. RB-Integrity states that there is no r-
broadcast duplication. RB-Uniformity is an “all or none” property (it is not possible for a pair to be delivered by a correct process
and to be never delivered by the other correct processes). RB-Termination is a liveness property: at least all the pairs r-broadcast by
correct processes are r-delivered by them.
An algorithm implementing the reliable broadcast abstraction is presented in Appendix A. This algorithm is a simple variant of
Bracha’s algorithm [5].
2.3 Two Preliminary Quorum-related Lemmas
This section states and proves two lemmas that will be central in the understanding and the proof of the construction of atomic
SWMR registers described in the next section.
Lemma 1 Letm, n, and t be positive integers.
(
m > n+t
2
) ⇔ (m ≥ ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1).
Proof
• Direction⇐: As x− 1 < ⌊x⌋, it follows that (m ≥ ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1) =⇒ (m > n+t
2
)
.
• Direction⇒: (m > n+t
2
)⇒ (m ≥ ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1).
– Case (n+ t) mod 2 = 0. We have thenm > n+t
2
⇒ m ≥ n+t
2
+ 1 = ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1.
– Case (n+ t) mod 2 = 1. We have thenm > n+t
2
⇒ m ≥ n+t
2
+ 1
2
= ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1.
✷Lemma 1
Lemma 2 Any two sets of processes Q1 andQ2 of size at least ⌊n+t2 ⌋+ 1 have at least one correct process in their intersection.
Proof When considering integers, it follows from Lemma 1, that “strictly more than n+t
2
” is equivalent to “at least ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1”.
• Q1 ∪Q2 ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn}. Hence, |Q1 ∪Q2| ≤ n.
• |Q1 ∩Q2| = |Q1|+ |Q2|− |Q1 ∪Q2| ≥ |Q1|+ |Q2|−n ≥ 2(⌊n+t2 ⌋+1)−n > 2(n+t2 )−n = t. Hence, |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ t+1,
from which it follows that Q1 ∩Q2 contains at least one correct process.
✷Lemma 2
3 Construction of Single-Writer/Multi-Reader Atomic Registers
3.1 Atomic Read/Write Registers in the Presence of Byzantine Processes
Single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) registers The fault-tolerant shared memory supplied to the upper abstraction layer is an
array denoted REG [1..n]. For each i, REG [i] is a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) register. This means that REG [i] can be
written only by pi. To that end, pi invokes the operation REG[i].write(v) where v is the value it wants to write into REG[i].
Differently, any process pj can read REG[i]. It invokes then the operation REG[i].read().
Let us notice that the “single-writer” requirement is natural in the presence of Byzantine processes. If registers could be written
by any process, it would be possible for the Byzantine processes to pollute the whole memory, and no non-trivial computation could
be possible.
The value returned by a read operation A register REG [i] contains the sequence of values (also called a history) that have
been written into it, and such a sequence is returned by the invocations of the operation REG[i].read(). Each register REG[i] is
initialized to the empty sequence (denoted ǫ), which corresponds to the default value ⊥. It is assumed that no process can write ⊥
into its register. Let us remark that returning a sequence of values is not a restriction, as, when a process obtains such a sequence h,
it can always consider only its last value (or ⊥ if h = ǫ).
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Notations Let pi and pj be correct processes. We use the following notations.
• op_read[j, i, h]: execution by a correct process pj of REG [i].read(), returning the history h.
• op_write[i,wsn]: wsn th execution by a correct process pi of REG[i].write().
• |h|: length of the history h (|ǫ| = 0).
Specification The correct behavior of an SWMR register is defined by the following properties.
• R-Termination (liveness). Let pi be a correct process.
– Each invocation of REG[i].write() issued by pi terminates.
– ∀ j, each invocation of REG[j].read() issued by pi terminates.
• R-Consistency (safety).
– Single history. Let pi be a (correct or faulty) process. There exists exactly one history Hi such that, for any correct
process pj , any op_read[j, i, h] is such that h is a prefix ofHi.
– Read followed by write. Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If op_read[j, i, h] terminates before op_write[i,wsn]
starts, then |h| < wsn .
– Write followed by read. Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If op_write[i,wsn] terminates before op_read[j, i, h]
starts, then wsn ≤ |h|.
– No read inversion. Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If op_read[j, i, h] terminates before op_read[k, i, h
′] starts,
then |h′| ≥ |h|.
As, whatever i, the invocations of REG[i].read() by a faulty process pj can return any value, the previous specification do not
need to take them into account. Moreover, it is possible that, while executing a code different from the code of the write operation,
a faulty process modifies the content of its register REG [j] (at the operational level, this happens when the messages it generates
could have been sent by a correct implementation of the operation write()). The specification of the consistency of such a register
REG [j] takes this into account in the “no read inversion” property.
The previous properties state that each register is linearizable [10]. This means that it is possible to totally order the executions
of the operations in such a way that (a) the execution of each operation appears as if it has been executed at a single point of the
time line between its start event and its end event, (b) no two operations have been executed at the same time, and (c) each read by a
correct process returns the sequence of values written before it in the sequence (when considering read/write registers, linearizability
is equivalent to atomicity [13]).
An important theorem associated with linearizability is the following [10]: If each object (register) is linearizable, then the set of
all the objects, considered as a single object, is linearizable. This means that linearizable objects compose for free.
3.2 The Construction
An algorithm constructing an SWMR atomic (linearizable) register in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes, is described in
Figure 1. This algorithm requires t < n/3, hence it is suited to the computing model BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. This algorithm uses a
wait(condition) statement. The corresponding process is blocked until condition becomes satisfied. While a process is blocked, it
can process the messages it receives.
Local variables Each process pi manages four local variables whose scope is the full computation (local variables are denoted
with lower case letters, and subscripted by the process index i).
• regi[1..n] is the local representation of the array REG [1..n] of atomic SWMR registers. Each local register regi[j] is initial-
ized to the empty sequence ǫ whose size is 0 (the corresponding value being the default value ⊥). The content of regi[j] is
called the local history of REG[j], as known by pi.
• wsni is a sequence number generator (initialized to 0) for the writes of REG[i] (issued by pi).
• rsni[1..n] is a local array such that rsni[j] is used to associate sequence numbers to the invocations of REG[j].read() issued
by pi. Each rsni[j] is initialized to 0.
• approx_rsni[1..n, 1..n] is a matrix of sequence numbers, each initialized to 0; approx_rsni[k, j] is the last read sequence
number (rsnk[j]) used by pk to to read REG[j], as known by pi.
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local variables initialization:
regi[1..n] ← [ǫ, . . . , ǫ]; wsni ← 0; rsni[1..n]← [0, . . . , 0], approx_rsni[1..n,1..n] ← [0, . . . , 0].
%——————————————————————————————————————-
operation REG[i].write(v) is
(01) wsni ← wsni + 1;
(02) R_broadcast WRITE(v, wsni);
(03) wait
(
WRITE_DONE(wsni) received from strictly more than
n+t
2
different processes
)
;
(04) return ().
operation REG[j].read() is
(05) rsni[j]← rsni[j] + 1;
(06) broadcast READ(j, rsni[j]);
(07) wait
(∃h : READ_VALUE(j,rsni[j], h) received from strictly more than n+t2 different processes
)
;
(08) return (h). % the last value in h can be returned if not interested in the history of REG[j] %
%——————————————————————————————————————-
when a message WRITE(v,wsn) from pj is R_delivered:
(09) wait (|regi[j]|+ 1 = wsn);
(10) regi[j]← regi[j] · v;
(11) send WRITE_DONE(wsn) to pj ;
(12) for k ∈ [1..n] do send READ_VALUE(j,approx_rsni[k, j], regi[j]) to pk end for.
when a message READ(j, rsn) from pk is received:
(13) if (approx_rsni[k, j] < rsn) then
(14) approx_rsni[k, j] ← rsn ;
(15) send READ_VALUE(j,rsn , regi[j]) to pk
(16) end if.
Figure 1: Array of SWMR atomic registers in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] (code for pi)
The operation REG[i].write(v) This operation is implemented by the client lines 01-04 and the server lines 09-12. Process pi
first increases wsni and r-broadcasts the message WRITE(v,wsni). Let us remark that this is the only place where the algorithm
uses the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction. The process pi then waits for acknowledgments (message WRITE_DONE(wsni))
from a quorum including strictly more than n+t
2
processes, and finally terminates the write operation. As we have seen (Lemmas 1
and 2), the intersection of any two quorums of such a size contains at least one correct process. This property will be used to prove
the consistency of the register REG [i].
When pi is r-delivered a message WRITE(v,wsn) from a process pj , it first waits until the previous write of REG[j] by pj has
locally terminated (line 09). Hence, all the writes of REG[j] are locally processed by pi in the order they have been issued by pj .
When |regi[j]|+ 1 = wsn , pi adds v at the tail of regi[j] (line 10), and sends back an acknowledgment to pj (line 11).
Finally, pi sends to each process pk the customized message READ_VALUE(j, approx_rsni[k, j], regi[j]) to inform pk that
this write from pj has locally been taken into account at pi (line 12). As we will see, this is to help terminate the invocations of
REG [j].read() issued by the correct processes.
The operation REG[j].read() This operation is implemented by the client lines 05-08 and the server lines 12-16. When pi wants
to read REG[j], it first broadcasts a read request appropriately identified (message READ(j, rsn i[j]), lines 05-06), and waits for
acknowledgment messages carrying the same history h (message READ_VALUE(j, rsni[j], h)), from a quorum of strictly more than
n+t
2
distinct processes (lines 07). When pi stops waiting, it knows that, when they sent their acknowledgments, the history of
REG [j] was equal to h for strictly more than n+t
2
processes. When this occurs, pi returns this history h as the result of the read
operation (line 08).
On its server side, when a process pi receives a read request message READ(j, rsn) from a process pk, it first checks if its view
of the read of REG [j] by pk is “late”, i.e., if approx_rsni[k, j] < rsn (line 13). If it is the case, pi updates approx_rsni[k, j]
(line 14), and sends by return to pk the message READ_VALUE(j, rsn, regi[j]), to inform it of its current value of REG[j] (line 15).
If approx_rsni[k, j] ≥ rsn , the read request is an old message and pi ignores it.
Comparing with the crash failure model It is known that the algorithms implementing an atomic register on top of an asyn-
chronous message-passing system prone to process crashes, require that “read have to write” [1]. More precisely, before returning
a value, a process must write this value to ensure atomicity. Doing so, it is not possible that two sequential read invocations, both
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concurrent with a write invocation, are such that the first read obtains the new value while the second read obtains the old value
(demanding the reader to write the value it is about to return guarantees that there is no new/old inversion [22]).
As Byzantine failures are more severe than crash failures, the algorithm of Figure 1 needs to use a mechanism analogous to
the “read have to write” to prevent new/old inversion from occurring. This is done by sending to each process pk the customized
message READ_VALUE(j, approx_rsni[j, k], regi[j]) issued at line 12. These messages play the role of writes, that allow the wait
statement of line 07 to always terminate with a correct history value for REG [j].
Message complexity It follows from the previous discussion that, in addition to a reliable broadcast, each write generates O(n)
messages WRITE_DONE() and O(n2) messages READ_VALUE()), and each read generates at most 2n messages. Hence, while the
algorithm presented in [1] requires the assumption t < n/2 (which is a necessary and sufficient requirement on the model parameter
t) and O(n) messages to implement an SWMR atomic register in the crash failure model, the proposed algorithm requires the
assumption t < n/3 (which is shown to be necessary and sufficient in Section 3.4), and O(n2) messages plus a reliable broadcast,
to implement SWMR atomic registers in the Byzantine asynchronous message-passing model.
3.3 Proof of the Construction
Lemma 3 Let n ≥ 3t+ 1. If pi is correct and invokes REG[i].write(), its invocation terminates.
Proof Let us first consider the first invocation of REG[i].write() by pi. Due to the RB-termination property of the underlying
reliable broadcast abstraction invoked by pi at line 02, each correct process pj r-delivers the message WRITE(−, 1). When this
occurs, the predicate of line 09 is satisfied, and pj sends the message WRITE_DONE(1) to pi. As there are strictly more than
n+t
2
correct processes (since n > 3t, n+t
2
= n− t − n−3t
2
< n− t), it follows that pi cannot remain blocked forever at line 03, and the
write invocation terminates.
Let us now observe that each correct process pj processes the messages WRITE(−,wsn) r-broadcast by pi in their sequence
number order (line 09). As pi uses the sequence of the consecutive integers to define its next sequence number wsn , it follows that
the same reasoning as for wsn = 1 applies iteratively to the subsequent invocations ofREG [i].write() issued by pi, which concludes
the proof. ✷Lemma 3
Lemma 4 (Single history). Let pi be a (correct or faulty) process. It exists a history Hi such that any invocation of the operation
REG [i].read() by a correct process returns a prefix ofHi.
Proof Given a registerREG[i], letHi be the the sequence of values defined by the sequence of messagesWRITE(v,wsn) r-delivered
from pi to the correct processes, where the order of the values in Hi is defined by the sequence numbers wsn = 1, 2, etc. It follows
from the RB-integrity and RB-uniformity properties of the reliable broadcast, and the lines 09-10 of the algorithm, that the history
regj [i] of any correct process pj is a prefix of Hi. Consequently, the messages READ_VALUE(−,−, regk[i]) sent by any correct
process pk at line 12 or 15 are such that regk[i] is a prefix of Hi. It then follows that, when a correct process pj computes h at
line 07, this history comes from strictly more than n+t
2
≥ t processes, thus at least from one correct process, and is consequently a
prefix ofHi. Hence, any invocation of the operation REG[i].read() by a correct process returns a prefix ofHi. ✷Lemma 4
Lemma 5 Let n ≥ 3t+ 1. If pj is correct and invokes REG[i].read(), its invocation terminates.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. let us assume that a correct process pj invokes REG[i].read() and this invocation never
terminates. This means that the predicate associated with the wait statement of line 07 remains false forever, namely, ∄h such that
the message READ_VALUE(i, rsnj [i], h) is received from strictly more than
n+t
2
different processes.
As pj is correct, it broadcasts the request message READ(i, sn) where sn = rsnj [i] (line 06), and this message is received by
all correct processes. Moreover, sn is the greatest sequence number ever used by pj to read REG[i], and, due to the contradiction
assumption, rsnj [i] keeps forever the value sn.
Let pk be any correct process. When pk receives READ(i, sn) from pj , the predicate approx_rsnk[j, i] < sn is satisfied
(line 13). This is because sn is greater than all previous sequence numbers used by pj to read REG [i]. It follows that pk updates
approx_rsnk[j, i] to sn = rsnj [i], and sends to pj the message READ_VALUE(i, sn, regk[i]) (lines 14-15). Moreover, as the read
of REG [i] by pj never terminates, approx_rsnk[j, i] remains forever equal to sn = rsnj [i].
As the predicate of line 07 remains forever false at pj , and pj receives at least (n − t) messages READ_VALUE(i, sn,−) (one
from each correct process), it follows that pj receives at least two messages READ_VALUE(i, sn, h) and READ_VALUE(i, sn, h
′)
such that h is a strict prefix of h or h′ is a strict prefix of h (this is because, due to Lemma 4, both h and h′ are prefixes of Hi).
Without loss of generality, let h′ be the shortest history received, and h be the longest.
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Due to the RB-uniformity property of the underlying broadcast abstraction, it follows that all the correct processes r-delivers the
same messages WRITE() from pi, and process them in the same order (line 09). Let pk be a correct process. It follows directly from
the code of the algorithm that, each time pk adds a value to regk[i] (line 10), it sends a message READ_VALUE(i, sn, regk[i]) to pj
(line 12). It follows that there is a finite time after which pj has received the very same message READ_VALUE(j, sn, h) from strictly
more than n+t
2
different processes. The predicate of line 07 becomes then satisfied. This contradicts the initial assumption, and the
lemma follows. ✷Lemma 5
Lemma 6 (Read followed by write). Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If op_read[j, i, h] terminates before op_write[i,wsn]
starts, then the returned history h is such that |h| < wsn .
Proof As pi is correct and has not yet invoked op_write[i,wsn] when pj terminates op_read[j, i, h], it follows that no correct
process r-delivers a message WRITE(v,wsn) from pi before op_read[j, i, h] terminates. Hence, when they received from pj the
message READ(i, sn) generated by op_read[j, i,−], strictly more than n+t
2
different processes px (i.e., strictly more than
n−t
2
correct processes) returned the same message READ_VALUE(i, sn, h) where h = regx[i] and |h| < wsn . Consequently, the history
h returned by pj is smaller than wsn . ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7 (Write followed by read). Let n > 3t. Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If op_write[i,wsn] terminates before
op_read[j, i, h] starts, then the returned history h is such that |h| ≥ wsn .
Proof It follows from line 03 and lines 10-11 that, when op_write[i,wsn] terminates (which implies before op_read[j, i, h] starts),
there is a quorum QW of strictly more than
n+t
2
processes px such that |regx[i]| ≥ wsn . Moreover, the invocation op_read[j, i, h]
obtains the samemessage READ_VALUES(i, sn, h) from a quorumQR including strictly more than
n+t
2
correct processes. According
to Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that QW ∩ QR contains at least one correct process py. As this process is such that |regy[i]| ≥ wsn ,
it follows that |h| ≥ wsn . ✷Lemma 7
Lemma 8 (No read inversion). Let n > 3t. Let pj and pk be two correct processes. If op_read[j, i, h] terminates before
op_read[k, i, h′] starts, we have then |h| ≤ |h′|.
Proof To terminate, op_read[j, i, h] received the same message READ_VALUE(j, rsn, h) from a quorumQR1 of strictly more than
n+t
2
different processes. Similarly, let QR2 be the quorum of strictly more than
n+t
2
processes that allowed op_read[k, i, h′] to
terminate.
According to Lemmas 1 and 2, there is a correct process px in QR1 ∩ QR2. As, (a) px is correct and sent the message
READ_VALUE(j, rsn, h) to pj , and later sent the message READ_VALUE(j, rsn, h
′) to pk, and (b) regx[i] can only increase, we
necessarily have |h| ≤ |h′|, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 8
The following theorem follows from the previous lemmas 3-8.
Theorem 1 The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements an array of n SWMR atomic registers (one register per process) in the
system model BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
To better understand and capture the behavior of the algorithm, the linearization points associated with the executions of (a) read
and write operations issued by the correct processes, and (b) the writes by faulty processes, whose values have been read by correct
processes, are described in Appendix B.
3.4 The Condition t < n/3 is Necessary and Sufficient
Theorem 2 The condition t < n/3 is necessary and sufficient to built an SWMR atomic register in BAMPn,t[∅].
Proof The algorithm presented in the previous section has shown that the condition t < n/3 is sufficient to built an SWMR atomic
register. So, the rest of the proof addresses the necessity part of the condition.
The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that there is an algorithm A that builds an atomic register in BAMPn,t[n ≤ 3t],
which means that it satisfies the R-consistency and R-termination properties stated in Section 3.1. For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we consider the largest possible value of t, i.e., n = 3t. Let us first observe that to guarantee R-termination, a process
cannot wait for messages from more than n− t = 2t processes.
Let us partition the set of processes into three sets Q1, Q2 and Q3, each of size (at most) t. Moreover, let us consider two
processes p1 ∈ Q1 and p2 ∈ Q2.
Let us consider a first execution E1 defined as follows.
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• The set of Byzantine processes is Q1; these processes do not send messages and appear as crashed.
• The process p2 ∈ Q2 writes a value v in REG[2]. Due to the R-termination property of the algorithm A, the invocation of
REG[2].write(v) by p2 terminates. Let τw be the time instant at which this write terminates.
Let E2 be a second execution defined as follows.
• All processes are correct, but the processes of Q2 execute no step before τr (defined below).
• After τw, the process p1 ∈ Q1 reads the register REG[2]. Due to the R-termination property of the algorithm A, and because
the processes ofQ2 could be Byzantine, the invocation of REG[2].read() by p1 terminates. Let τr be the time instant at which
this read terminates. As, no process of Q2 executes a step before the read terminates, p2 does not write REG[2] before τr.
Consequently, according to the R-consistency property read followed by write, REG[2] has still its initial value ǫ. It follows
that the read operation by p1 returns this initial value.
Let us finally consider E3, a third execution defined as follows.
• The set of Byzantine processes is Q3, and these processes behave exactly as in E1 with respect to the processes of Q2, and
exactly as in E2 with those of Q1.
• The messages sent by the processes ofQ1 to the processes ofQ2 and by the processes ofQ2 to the processes ofQ1 are delayed
until after τr.
• The messages exchanged between themselves by the processes of Q2 ∪ Q3 are received at exactly the same time instants as
in E1. Similarly, the messages exchanged between themselves by the processes of Q1 ∪ Q3 are received at exactly the same
time instants as in E2.
• As the very same time instants as in E1, process p2 ∈ Q2 writes a value v in REG [2]. Since, from the point of view of the
processes of Q2, the executions E1 and E3 are indistinguishable, the invocation of REG[2].write(v) by p2 terminates at τw
too.
• As in execution E2, after τw the process p1 ∈ Q1 reads the register REG [2]. Since, from the point of view of the processes
of Q1, the executions E2 and E3 are indistinguishable, the invocation of REG[2].read() by p1 terminates at τr and returns ǫ.
But this violates the R-Consistency property write followed by read, which contradicts the existence of Algorithm A.
✷Theorem 2
4 A Few Simple Abstractions on Top of SWMR Atomic Registers
This section presents two simple uses of the previous construction of an array of n SWMR atomic registers. Another example is given
in Appendix C [4]. In these algorithms, the simplicity comes from the SWMR atomic registers built on top of a message-passing
system. This SWMR atomic register abstractions provides us with an abstraction level that allows for simple solutions.
The classical notations for atomic registers are used in the following, namely, given an atomic registerXX ,XX ← v stands for
XX.write(v), and x ← XX stands for x ← XX.read(v). Moreover, only the last value of the sequence returned by XX.read(v)
is considered.
4.1 One-Shot Write-Snapshot
This section describes a very simple one-shot write-snapshot object. This object provides the processes with a single operation
denoted write_snapshot(). This operation has a single parameter, namely the value that the invoking process wants to write in the
snapshot object. A process pi can invoke write_snapshot() at most once. This operation returns to the invoking process pi a set
outputi made up of pairs 〈j, w〉, where w is the value written by the process pj .
Specification A one-shot write-snapshot object is defined by the following properties.
• Termination. The invocation of write_snapshot(v) by a correct process pi terminates.
• Self-inclusion. If pi is correct and invokes write_snapshot(v), then 〈i, v〉 ∈ outputi.
• Containment. If both pi and pj are correct and invoke write_snapshot(), then outputi ⊆ outputj or outputj ⊆ outputi.
• Validity. If 〈j, w〉 ∈ outputi, then pj wrote w in the write_snapshot object.
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operation write_snapshot(vi):
(01) IN [i] ← vi;
(02) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux1[x] ← IN [x] end for;
(03) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux2[x] ← IN [x] end for;
(04) while (aux1 6= aux2) do
(05) aux1 ← aux2;
(06) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux2[x] ← IN [x] end for
(07) end while;
(08) outputi ← { 〈j, aux1[j]〉 | aux1[j] 6= ⊥ };
(09) return(outputi).
Figure 2: Write-snapshot in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] (code for pi)
The algorithm The internal representation of the write-snapshot object is an array of SWMR atomic registers. This array, denoted
IN [1..n], is obtained from the construction of Figure 1 (slightly and easily modified at line 09 to ensure that a process writes at most
once its register). It is assumed that IN [1..n] is initialized to [⊥, . . . ,⊥].
The algorithm implementing the operation write_snapshot() is very simple (Figure 2). The invoking process pi first deposits
its value in IN [i] (line 01), and issues an asynchronous “sequential double scan” (lines 02-03). If the sequential double scan is not
successful (line 04), it executes other double scans (lines 02-03) until a pair of them is successful, i.e., aux1[1..n] = aux2[1..n].
After the successful double scan, pi computes its output outputi, namely, a set containing the pairs 〈j, w〉 such that w is the value
written by pj (as known by the last successful double scan).
The termination of the algorithm is an immediate consequence of the bounded number of processes, and the fact that each
register IN [i] is a one-write register. The validity and self-inclusion are trivial. The containment property follows from the fact that
the number of non-⊥ entries can only increase.
4.2 Correct-Only Agreement
A correct-only agreement object is a one-shot object that provides the processes with a single operation denoted correct_only_agreement().
This operation is used by each process to propose a value and decide a set of values. A decided set contains only values proposed by
correct processes and the decided sets satisfy the containment property. According to the topological bounds stated in [9], the prob-
lem captured by the correct-only agreement object can be solved if and only if n > (dim(I) + 2)t, where dim(I) is the dimension
of the colorless input complex I with which the problem is instantiated. In our context, this necessary and sufficient condition boils
down to n > (w + 1)t, where w > 1 is the maximal number of distinct values that can be proposed by the correct processes in any
execution (in the topology parlance, w − 1 is the greatest dimension of a simplex of the colorless input complex I).
Specification A correct-only agreement object is defined by the following properties. As in the previous section, outputi denotes
the set of values output by a correct process pi.
• Termination. The invocation of correct_only_agreement() by a correct process pi terminates.
• Containment. If both pi and pj are correct and invoke correct_only_agreement(), then outputi ⊆ outputj or outputj ⊆
outputi.
• Validity. The set outputi of a correct process pi is not empty and contains only values proposed by at least one correct process.
The algorithm The algorithm implementing the operation correct_only_agreement(), is described in Figure 3. As the reader
can see, this algorithm is obtained from a simple adaptation of the algorithm implementing the operation write_snapshot(). The
modified parts are the predicate used at line 04, and the computation of the output at line 08.
More precisely, a successful double scan is now necessary to exit the while loop, but is no longer sufficient. In addition, a process
pi must observe there is at least one value that has been proposed by (t+ 1) processes (i.e., by at least one correct process). Finally,
the output outputi contains all the values that, from pi’s point of view, have been proposed by at least (t+ 1) processes.
As in the previous section, the containment property is a consequence of the fact that the writes in the array IN [1..n] are atomic,
and the number of non-⊥ entries can only increase. The termination property is a consequence of the following observations: (a)
there is a bounded number of processes, (b) the atomic registers are one-write registers, and (c) the condition n > (w + 1)t. The
validity follows from the condition n > (w + 1)t (hence there is at least one value that appears (t+ 1) times), and the predicate of
line 04.
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operation correct_only_agreement(vi):
(01) IN [i] ← vi;
(02) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux1[x] ← IN [x] end for;
(03) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux2[x] ← IN [x] end for;
(04) while [(aux1 6= aux2) ∨ (∄v : |{j : aux1[j] = v}| > t)] do
(05) aux1 ← aux2;
(06) for x ∈ {1, ..., n} do aux2[x] ← IN [x] end for
(07) end while;
(08) outputi ← { v : |{j : aux1[j] = v}| > t};
(09) return(outputi).
Figure 3: Correct-only agreement in BAMPn,t[t < n/(w + 1)] (code for pi)
Remark Both the one-write write-snapshot object and the correct-only agreement object share the same termination and con-
tainment properties. They can be seen as dual the one from the other in the following sense. One-write write-snapshot satisfies
self-inclusion and a weak validity property, while correct-only agreement is not required to satisfy self-inclusion, but is constrained
by a stronger validity property. As we have seen, both objects can be implemented by the same generic algorithm whose instances
differ essentially in the predicate used to exit the while loop (line 04).
5 Solving Multidimensional Approximate Agreement
This section shows how an algorithm designed for the Byzantine asynchronousmessage-passing system model can be easily adapted
to the Byzantine asynchronous shared memory model introduced in Section 3. The shared memory abstraction being at a higher
abstraction level than message-passing, the shared memory version of the algorithm seems much easier to understand.
5.1 The Multidimensional Approximate Agreement Problem
Approximate agreement The ǫ-approximate agreement problem has been introduced in the context of synchronous and asyn-
chronous message-passing systems where processes can commit Byzantine failures [8]. Each process proposes a value in R, and
each correct process has to decide a value such that: (a) any decided value is in the range of the values proposed by the correct
processes (validity), and (b) the distance between any two values decided by correct processes is at most ǫ (agreement). It is shown
in [8] that t < n/3 is a necessary and sufficient condition on the number of Byzantine processes when one has to solve ǫ-approximate
agreement in both synchronous and asynchronous systems.
Multidimensional approximate agreement The ǫ-approximate agreement problem has been generalized in [18] to the case where
each input value is a point in Rd (space of dimension d). Such a point is defined by a size d vector (one entry per coordinate).
The problem is then defined by the following properties. Let multi_approx_agreement() be the associated operation invoked by
processes.
• Termination. The invocation of multi_approx_agreement() by a correct process pi terminates.
• Validity. The value decided by any correct process is a point of Rd within the convex hull of the points proposed by the correct
processes.
• Agreement. The Euclidean distance between any two points decided by correct processes is at most ǫ.
It is shown in [18] that n > (d+ 2)t is a sufficient and necessary requirement for the problem to be solved.
5.2 Solving Multidimensional Approximate Agreement
An algorithm solving the multidimensional approximate agreement problem on top of the shared memory abstraction is presented
in Figure 4. This algorithm is an adaptation of Mendes-Herlihy’s algorithm suited to asynchronous message-passing with up to
t < n/3 Byzantine processes [18].
Shared memory: arrays of n SWMR atomic registers The processes cooperate through the following arrays of SWMR atomic
registers. Each register is written at most once by its writer. An input value is a d-dimensional vector (coordinates of the input of pi
in Rd).
• VAL[1..n]: array such that VAL[i] is written by pi to publish its input.
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• VIEW [1..n]: array such that VIEW [i] contains pi’s view of the inputs.
• EST [1..][1..n]: array such that EST [r][i] contains pi’s estimate of its decision value at round r.
• MAX [1..n]: array such that MAX [i] = r means that pi has estimated that r rounds are enough to reach approximate
agreement. Initially,MAX [i] = +∞.
The value of any of these arrays is obtained with a collect() operation, which (differently from a snapshot) is an asynchronous and
unordered read of the corresponding entries of the array.
Procedures used in the algorithm Let X denote a multiset of values of Rd and CH(X) the convex hull of such a multiset.
Algorithm 4 uses the notion of safe area introduced in [18]. The safe area ofX is defined by
Safet(X) =
⋂
X′⊆X,|X′|=|X|−t
CH(X ′).
Informally, this captures the region of Rd that is contained in all the convex hulls of the subsets of cardinal n − t of |X |. If the
values of |X | are proposed by distinct processes, then this region is consequently contained in the convex hull of the subset of the
values of X proposed by correct processes. It is shown in [18] that for any X such that |X | > t(d + 1), the safe area Safet(X) is
non-empty [18, Lemma 3.6].
The procedures bary(S), MultiDimMidpoint(S), and SingleDimMaxDist(S), where S is a convex polytope of Rd, are called
locally by the processes; bary(S) denotes the barycenter of S, while the two later are defined as follows, by (where s[x] designate
the xth coordinate of s ∈ Rd:
∀x ∈ {1, . . . , d} : MultiDimMidpoint(S)[x] = (max{s[x], s ∈ S}+min{s[x], s ∈ S})/2,
and SingleDimMaxDist(S) = max
x∈{1,...,d}
(max{s[x], s ∈ S} −min{s[x], s ∈ S}) .
Local variables at each process pi Each process pi manages the following local data structures: two arraysmy_viewi[1..n] and
viewsi[1..n], both initialized to [⊥, ...,⊥]; a set of points safe_initi ; a local estimate esti of the point that will be locally decided;
an array valsi[1..n] of estimates values; an arraymax_ri[1..n] containing round number upper bounds; and ri which contains pi’s
current round number.
Behavior of a process pi A process pi first writes its input value vi (point in ∈ Rd) in VAL[i], and collects a local view
(my_viewi[1..n]) including at least (n − t) inputs (lines 01-02). Then, to make it public, pi writes its view in VIEW [i], and
collects in viewsi the views of at least (n − t) processes (lines 03-04). The process pi then calculates in safe_initi the barycenter
of the safe area of these views (line 05). The parameters d and ǫ of the problem, and the set of barycenters safe_initsi of its current
instance, allow pi to locally compute an upper bound on the number of rounds to be executed, which is written into the atomic
register MAX [i] (line 06). The set of barycenters safe_initsi is also used to compute pi’s first estimate (esti) of its decision value
(line 07).
Then, process pi starts a sequence of asynchronous rounds whose aim is to refine its current estimate esti (lines 09-13) until it
returns its last estimate value. This occurs when pi attains a round ri during which it sees a set of more than t processes –i.e., at least
one correct process– such that each process pj of this set posted in its atomic registerMAX [j] a last round upper bound smaller than
ri. This is captured by the outer termination predicate (|{x : max_ri[x] < ri}| > t) used at lines 12 and 13.
During a loop iteration ri, pi first writes its current decision value estimate in EST [ri][i] (line 09), and repeatedly collects both
current estimates of decision values written in EST [ri][1..n], and upper bounds of the last round number from MAX [1..n], until
either the outer termination predicate is satisfied, or it sees at least (n − t) estimates computed at round ri (first sub-predicate of
line 11). The use of the outer termination predicate in the inner repeat loop (line 11) allows pi not to remain blocked forever waiting
for a correct process that has already terminated. Then, if it knows enough values deposited in EST [ri], pi collects again current
estimates of decision values written in EST [ri] (line 12), and computes a new estimate esti (line 13). Finally, once a large enough
number of rounds is reached (line 14), pi returns (decides) its current estimate value (line 15).
5.3 Proof of the Algorithm
The proof of the correctness of the algorithm is similar to, and follows the structure of, the one of Mendes-Herlihy’s algorithm [18].
The following lemmas prove that, at lines 03, 05, and 12, all the correct processes receive at least n− t values in common. This
replaces the guarantee given by the module denoted RBReceiveWitness() in [18], which is in charge on the reception of messages
sent with an underlying reliable broadcast on FIFO channels.
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operation multi_approx_agreement(vi):
(01) VAL[i] ← vi; ri ← 0;
(02) repeat my_viewi [1..n]← VAL.collect() until (|{x |my_viewi [x] 6= ⊥}| ≥ n− t) end repeat;
(03) my_viewi [1..n]← VAL.collect(); VIEW [i] ← my_viewi [1..n];
(04) repeat viewsi [1..n]← VIEW .collect() until (|{x | viewsi [x] 6= ⊥}| ≥ n− t) end repeat;
(05) viewsi [1..n]← VIEW .collect(); safe_initsi ← {bary(Safet(X)) : X ∈ viewsi};
(06) MAX [i] ← ⌈log2
(√
d/ǫ · SingleDimMaxDist(safe_initsi )
)⌉;
(07) esti ← bary(Safet(safe_initsi));
(08) repeat ri ← ri + 1;
(09) EST [ri][i] ← esti;
(10) repeat valsi[1..n]← EST [ri].collect();max_ri[1..n]← MAX .collect()
(11) until (|{x : valsi[x] 6= ⊥}| ≥ n− t) ∨ (|{x : max_ri[x] < ri}| > t) end repeat;
(12) if (|{x : valsi[x] 6= ⊥}| ≥ n− t) then valsi[1..n]← EST [ri].collect();
(13) esti ← MultiDimMidpoint(Safet(valsi)) end if
(14) until (|{x : max_ri[x] < ri}| > t) end repeat;
(15) return(esti).
Figure 4: Multidimensional approximate agreement in BAMPn,t[t < n/(d+ 2)] (code for pi)
Lemma 9 For any pair correct processes pi and pj , |my_viewi ∩my_viewj | ≥ n− t.
Proof A correct process performs a collect at line 03 only if it observes at least n− t values during its last collect at line 02. Without
loss of generality, let pi be the first process that starts its collect at line 03.
Let τ be the time at which pi starts its collect at line 03. At least (n − t) values have already been written in VAL by time τ
(otherwise, pi would not perform this collect). Because of the linearizability (atomicity) property of the registers, any collect that
starts after τ will read the values already written in the array VAL, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 9
The reasoning is the same for the next two lemmas. Lemma 10 is on the sets viewi computed at line 05, while Lemma 11 is on the
sets valsi computed at line 12.
Lemma 10 For any pair correct processes pi and pj , |viewsi ∩ viewsj | ≥ n− t.
Let valsi,r be the set of values observed at line 12 by process pi at round r.
Lemma 11 For any pair of correct processes pi and pj that perform a collect at line 12 during round r, |valsi,r ∩ valsj,r| ≥ n− t.
The following lemma replaces Lemma 4.16 in [18]. It proves that all correct processes execute enough rounds. Let rmin be the
minimum round estimate calculated by a correct process at line 06.
Lemma 12 All correct processes run for at least rmin rounds.
Proof A correct process pi may exit the loop at lines 08-14 only if it observes at least t + 1 estimates of the number of rounds
(values written in MAX ) lower than its round number. These t + 1 values must include at least one value written by a correct
process. Process pi will thus execute at least rmin rounds. ✷Lemma 12
The following lemma guarantees that no correct process can run for an infinite number of steps.
Lemma 13 All correct processes terminate their invocation of multi_approx_agreement().
Proof The algorithm does not contain any wait statement and contains four loops.
• The loop at line 02. All the correct processes write in VAL[1..n], thus all correct processes will eventually observe at least
(n− t) values during their collect and exit the loop.
• The loop at line 04. The reasoning is the same as previously. All the correct processes write in VIEW , thus all correct
processes will eventually observe at least (n− t) values during their collect and exit the loop.
• The loop at lines 10-11. Let rmin_exit be the smallest round after which a correct process pi exits the loop. Thus, at any round
r ≤ rmin_exit, each correct process writes a value in EST [r]. Because pi exited the loop at round rmin_exit, it observed strictly
more than t finite values smaller than rmin_exit in MAX [1..n]. Hence, any other correct process pj , at round r ≥ rmin_exit,
will then observe strictly more than t finite values smaller than r in MAX [1..n] and exit the loop.
• The loop at lines 08-14. As all the correct processes write a finite value in MAX [1..n], it follows that each of them will
eventually observe at least than (n − t)t finite values during a collect at line 10. It will consequently execute the loop at
lines 08-14 a finite number of times, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
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✷Lemma 13
As noticed in [18], for the decided values to be within ǫ of each other, it is sufficient that they be within ǫ/
√
d of each other in every
coordinate. The reader can find in [18] the proof of Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 stated below. In [18], their proofs depend only on
the guarantees given by the module RBReceiveWitness() devoted to the management of message reception. These guarantees are
replaced here by the previous Lemmas 9, 10, and 11.
Lemma 14 For any correct process pi, after R ≥ log2
(√
d/ǫ · SingleDimMaxDist(safe_initsi)
)
rounds, the values of the correct
processes are within distance ǫ/
√
d of each other at any dimension x [18, Lemma 4.10].
Lemma 15 At any round, for any correct process pi, esti is within the convex hull of the inputs of the correct processes [18, Lemma
4.17].
Using the previous lemmas, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The algorithm presented in Figure 4 is a correct implementation of multidimensional approximate agreement in the
BAMPn,t[t < n/(d+ 2)] model.
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 13 (termination), Lemmas 12 and 14 (agreement) and Lemma 15 (validity). ✷Theorem 3
6 Conclusion
This paper has first proposed a clean notion of atomic registers in the presence of Byzantine failures, and has then shown how to build
it on top of a Byzantine asynchronous message-passing system. More precisely, an algorithm building a shared memory abstraction,
made up of n single-writer/multi-reader atomic registers, has been presented and proved correct. The paper has also shown that
t < n/3 is a necessary and sufficient condition for such an algorithm.
The paper has then presented distributed algorithms suited to such a shared memory abstraction, which can cope with up to
t Byzantine processes. The simplicity of these algorithms constitutes a strong motivation for the use of such a shared memory
abstraction in the presence of Byzantine processes. As, for a lot of problems, algorithms are more difficult to design and prove
correct in a message-passing system than in a shared memory system, the proposed abstraction should allow easier designs and
proofs for other algorithms that have to cope with Byzantine failures.
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A An Algorithm Implementing the Reliable Broadcast Abstraction
The r-broadcast algorithm presented in Figure 5 assumes t < n/3. It is a simple variant of Bracha’s algorithm [5]. The operation
broadcast XXX(), where XXX is a message tag, is a simple macro-operation standing for “for x ∈ {1, . . . , n} do send XXX() to px
end for” (the sending order is arbitrary, which means that, if the sender crashes while executing this statement, an arbitrary subset
of processes will receive the message).
Each process pi manages a local array nexti[1..n], where nexti[j] is the sequence number sn of the next application message
(namely, APP(−, sn)) from pj , that pi will process (line 03). Initially, for all i, j, nexti[j] = 1.
When a process pi invokes R_broadcast APP(v, sn), it broadcasts the message APP(v, sn) (line 01) where sn is its next sequence
number. in its “server” role, the behavior of a process pi is as follows.
• When a process pi receives a message APP(v, sn) from a process pj for the first time, it first waits until it can process this
message (line 03). Process pi then broadcasts a message ECHO(j, v, sn) (line 04). If the message just received is not the first
message APP(−, sn), pj is Byzantine and the message is discarded.
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
16 D. Imbs, S. Rajsbaum, M. Raynal & J. Stainer
operation R_broadcast APP(v, sn):
(01) broadcast APP(v, sn).
when a message APP(v, sn) from pj is received:
(02) if APP(−, sn)) never received from pj
(03) then wait (nexti[j] = sn);
(04) broadcast ECHO(j, v, sn)
(05) end if.
when a message ECHO(j, v, sn) is received:
(06) if ECHO(j, v, sn) received from strictly more than n+t
2
different processes
(07) ∧ READY(j, v, sn) never sent
(08) then broadcast READY(j, v, sn)
(09) end if.
when a message READY(j, v, sn) is received:
(10) if READY(j, v, sn) received from at least t+ 1 different processes
(11) ∧ READY(j, v, sn) never sent
(12) then broadcast READY(j, v, sn)
(13) end if;
(14) if READY(j, v, sn) received from at least 2t+ 1 different processes
(15) ∧ APP(v, sn) by pj never R_delivered
(16) then R_deliver APP(v, sn) from pj ;
(17) nexti[j]← nexti[j] + 1
(18) end if.
Figure 5: Generalized Reliable Broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3], (code for process pi)
• Then, when pi has received the same message ECHO(j, v, sn) from “enough” processes (where “enough”means “strictly more
than (n+ t)/2 different processes”), and has not yet broadcast a message READY(j, v, sn), it does so (lines 06-09).
The aim of (a) the messages ECHO(j, v, sn), and (b) the cardinality “strictly greater than (n+ t)/2 processes”, is to ensure that
no two correct processes can r-deliver distinct messages from pj (in the case where pj is Byzantine). The aim of the messages
READY(j, v, sn) is related to the liveness of the algorithm. Namely, its aim is to allow the r-delivery by the correct processes
of the very same message APP(v, sn) from pj , and this must always occur if pj is correct. It is nevertheless possible that a
message r-broadcast by a Byzantine process pj be never r-delivered by the correct processes.
• Finally, when pi has received the message READY(j, v, sn) from (t + 1) different processes, it broadcasts the same message
READY(j, v, sn), it not yet done. This is required to ensure the RB-termination property. If pi has received “enough”messages
READY(j, v, sn) (as before “enough” means “from strictly more than (n+ t)/2 different processes”), it r-delivers the message
APP(v, sn) r-broadcast by pj .
Proofs that this algorithm satisfies the properties defining the reliable broadcast abstraction can be found in [5, 20].
B Linearization Points Associated with SWMR Registers
To better understand and capture the behavior of the algorithm, we exhibit below a linearization order [10]. A linearization point is
a point of the timeline (defined from an omniscient external observer point of view) at which a read or write operation issued by a
correct process (or a write by a faulty process whose value has been read by a correct process) appears to have been instantaneously
executed. For an operation issued by a correct process, this point has to lie between the beginning and the end of the corresponding
execution.
Let us notice that a read by a Byzantine process may return any value. Hence, whatever the value it returns such a read invocation
does not need to be linearized. We have the same for a write by a Byzantine process, whose value is never returned by a read from a
correct process.
According to the Lemmas 4, 6, 7, and 8, we can define the following linearization points.
• An invocation of the operationREG[i].write(v) issued by a correct process pi is linearized at the timemin(τw, τr) where
– τw is the end of the wait statement executed by pi at line 03, and
– τr is the end of the wait statement of line 07 executed by the first correct process that returns a history including the value
v.
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
Shared Memory on Top of Byzantine Message-passing Systems 17
• A write of a value v into REG[i] by a Byzantine process is linearized at the end of the wait statement of line 07 executed by
the first correct process that returns the value v.
• Let op_read[i, j, h] such that the last value of h is v. Let τb and τe be the times at which op_read[i, j, h] starts and terminates,
respectively. Let τw be the linearization point at which v has been added to REG[j].
Let us observe that τw < τe (otherwise, the history h returned by op_read[i, j, h] could not end with v). There are two cases.
– If τw < τb: op_read[i, j, h] is linearized at time τb.
– If τb < τw: op_read[i, j, h] is linearized just after τw. If two or more read invocations must be linearized just after the
same time τ , their linearization times are ordered according to their starting times.
C Immediate Snapshot
The immediate snapshot object has been introduced in [4]. Such an object is a one-shot object that provides the processes with a
single operation, denoted immediate_snapshot(). When a process invokes this operation, it proposes a value, and obtains an output
which is a set of pairs similar to the one obtained in the one-shot write-snapshot.
Specification in the crash failure model When considering the asynchronous crash failure model, a one-shot immediate snapshot
object is defined by the following properties. As in the previous section, outputi denotes the set of values output by a correct process
pi.
• Termination. The invocation of immediate_snapshot() by a correct process pi terminates.
• Validity. If 〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputj , then pi invoked immediate_snapshot(vi).
• Self-inclusion. If pi returns from immediate_snapshot(), then 〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputi.
• Containment. If pi and pj return from immediate_snapshot(), then outputi ⊆ outputj or outputj ⊆ outputi.
• Immediacy. [(〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputj) ∧ (〈j, vj〉 ∈ outputi)] ⇒ (outputi = outputj).
Algorithm The implementation of immediate_snapshot() in the crash failure model given in [4] is described in Figure 6 (the
reader can consult Chapter 8 of [24], for a pedagogical presentation and a proof of this algorithm).
operation immediate_snapshot(vi) is
(01) REG[j]← vi;
(02) repeat LEVEL[i] ← LEVEL[i]− 1;
(03) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do leveli[j]← LEVEL[j] end for;
(04) viewi ← {x | leveli[x] ≤ leveli[i]}
(05) until (|viewi| ≥ leveli[i]) end repeat;
(06) let outputi = { 〈x,REG[x]〉 : x ∈ viewi };
(07) return(outputi).
Figure 6: Immediate snapshot algorithm (code for pi) [4]
The algorithm uses two arrays of SWMR atomic registers denoted REG[1..n] and LEVEL[1..n], initialized to [⊥, ...,⊥] and
[n+ 1, ..., n+ 1], respectively. Only pi can write REG[i] and LEV EL[i]).
A process pi first writes its value in REG[i] (line 01). The array LEVEL[1..n] can be thought of as a ladder, where initially
each process pi is at the top of the ladder, namely, at level (n + 1). Then pi descends the ladder (line 02), one step after the other,
according to predefined rules, until it stops at some level (or crashes). While descending the ladder, pi registers its current position
in the ladder in the atomic register LEVEL[i]. After it has stepped down from one ladder level to the next one, pi computes a local
view (denoted viewi) of the progress of the other processes in their descent of the ladder. That view contains the processes px seen
by pi at the same or a lower ladder level (i.e., such that leveli[x] ≤ LEVEL[i], line 04). Then, if the current level ℓ of pi is such that
pi sees at least ℓ processes in its view (i.e., processes that are at its level or a lower level), pi stops at the level ℓ of the ladder. Finally,
pi computes outputi, which is a set of pairs 〈x, vx〉 determined from the values of its last view viewi. This concise algorithm is such
that the sets viewi of the processes that terminate the algorithm, satisfy the following main property: if |viewi| = ℓ, pi stopped at
the level ℓ, and there are ℓ processes whose current level is ≤ ℓ. From this property, follow the validity, self-inclusion, containment
and immediacy properties that define the one-shot immediate snapshot object.
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From the crash failure model to the Byzantine failure model Interestingly, the previous algorithm still works when consid-
ering that the arrays of SWMR atomic registers REG [1..n] and LEVEL[1..n] are implemented in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] with the
construction of Figure 1.
In this case, the previous specification and line 03 have to be slightly modified as follows. Remembering that C denote the set
of correct processes, let c(outputi) = outputi ∩ C (projection of outputi on the correct processes). The specification of immediate
snaspshot in the Byzantine failure model is defined by the following properties.
• Termination. The invocation of immediate_snapshot() by a correct process pi terminates.
• Validity. If pi and pj are correct and 〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputj , then pi invoked immediate_snapshot(vi).
• Self-inclusion. If pi is correct and invokes immediate_snapshot(), then 〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputi.
• Containment. If pi and pj are correct and invoke immediate_snapshot(), then c(outputi) ⊆ c(outputj) or c(outputj) ⊆
c(outputi).
• Immediacy. If pi and pj are correct, [(〈i, vi〉 ∈ outputj) ∧ (〈j, vj〉 ∈ outputi)] ⇒ (c(outputi) = c(outputj)).
As far as line 03 is concerned, we have the following. If pj is Byzantine, LEVEL[j] can contain an arbitrary value. Hence,
instead of considering the content of LEVEL[j], pi considers the number of times that pj has written this register. Due to the
algorithm of Figure 1, this number is equal to |LEVEL[j].read()| (the length of the sequence returned by LEVEL[j].read()). It
follows that pi has to assign the value (n + 1) − |LEVEL[j].read()| to leveli[j]. It is easy to see that this quantity is the value of
LEVEL[j] when only crash failures are committed.
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